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McDonough, James Lee Nashville: The Western Confederacy's Final Gamble.
University of Tennessee Press, $39.95 ISBN 1572333227
Confederate army had long odds
Could Hood's gamble have paid off?
Nashville: The Western Confederacy's Final Gamble serves as the
capstone of James Lee McDonough's chronicles dealing with Tennessee's major
Civil War battles. McDonough, a Nashville native and Civil War scholar, has
previously penned studies of Shiloh, Stones River, Chattanooga, and co-authored
Five Tragic Hours: The Battle of Franklin (1983) with noted Confederate Army
of Tennessee historian, Thomas Connolly. Nashville marks McDonough's
second foray into Confederate General John Bell Hood's 1864 ruinous campaign
and seeks to correct what he believes is a historical misconception. Earlier
historians have focused upon Franklin as the climax of Hood's campaign and
perceived the subsequent Battle of Nashville as merely the Army of Tennessee's
desperate last stand. McDonough, however, argues that the Confederates, despite
a compromised campaign strategy, the lack of proper logistical support,
deteriorating morale, internal staff dissention, and their losses at Franklin
believed they could take the Federal garrison at Nashville and thus turn the war's
tide. Furthermore, he contends that the Federals' overconfidence and the
unchecked ambition of several senior commanders nearly squandered their
advantage and narrowly escaped disaster.
McDonough infuses this tale with his characteristic emotionally-charged
first-hand accounts and colorful personality profiles. For example, his
description of the continuing Confederate misfortunes stemming from the escape
of Major General John Schofield's Union force at Spring Hill highlights rebel
commanders' private and professional passions. He thoroughly traces the turmoil
created by the tragic 1863 death of cavalry leader Earl Van Dorn at the hand of a
jealous Spring Hill husband, Dr. George Peters. The rift created by the incident
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festered between the couple. As a result of her husband's absence, Jessie
McKissack Peters, reportedly continued to work her charms upon the returning
Confederate officers in 1864, creating some degree of turmoil in the rebel
leadership. Mrs. Peters's alleged intrigues, whiskey's probable role in the Spring
Hill debacle, lack of command initiative, and Hood's suspected use of narcotics
to alleviate his painful war wounds all seemed to factor into the fog of war that
confounded the Confederates at Spring Hill. Whatever the causes of their failure,
the results were clear. Hood's best chance to destroy the Union opposition in
Middle Tennessee piecemeal literally slipped through his grasp in the middle of
the night.
A blindly-enraged Hood blamed his subordinates for this lost opportunity,
and he threw his forces headlong into the well-defended Union positions at
Franklin to atone for their failures. McDonough recounts these infamous, tragic
hours and explains on page 137 why, despite his heavy losses, Hood refused to
admit he had been defeated and continued his march on Nashville. The maimed
Confederate leader still believed he had a plausible plan for victory and had
determined that the troops would be better satisfied, even after defeat if, . . . a
brave and vigorous effort was made to save the country. In discussing Hood's
rationale for proceeding toward Nashville, McDonough refocuses attention on
Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest's Battle of the Cedars near
Murfreesboro. By dispatching Forrest to Murfreesboro, Hood sought to cut off
Thomas from receiving reinforcements and to embarrass the Federals by gaining
the capture of convalescing and inexperienced Union garrison troops manning
the extensive logistical base, Fortress Rosecrans. Hood also hoped that a move
against Murfreesboro would compel Major General George Thomas to take the
initiative, send out a rescue expedition, and give the Confederates better odds
against a split force. A spirited Federal defense at the Battle of the Cedars sent
Forrest reeling in retreat. This stinging defeat deprived Hood of his intended
results, for Thomas failed to take the bait, and more importantly, left the Army
of Tennessee without Forrest's sorely-needed cavalry veterans during the ensuing
conflict to the north.
On the Federal side, petty jealousies and aspirations for martial glory among
the officers nearly spelled ruin for the Nashville garrison. According to
McDonough, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had publicly outlined
Hood's campaign strategy in an effort to induce Major General William T.
Sherman to move Union forces north out of Georgia. The Federals obliged and
rushed to ready the Cumberland River defenses around Nashville to counter the
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threat. Animosities between Thomas and Schofield jeopardized the Union
advantage by threatening to divide the army's loyalties during the operation. In
the days prior to the battle, Schofield incessantly lobbied Grant to axe Thomas
because of the Rock of Chickamauga's hesitation to attack. McDonough, who
has also written a biography of Schofield, concluded that Thomas's rationale for
a delay was entirely sound based upon the bad winter weather and the slight
level of offensive threat posed by Hood's army. Regardless, Schofield's
criticisms greatly alarmed General Ulysses S. Grant. Frantic, Grant determined
to relieve Thomas, but had to recall his messenger carrying this order after news
of Thomas's victory arrived. Even after the victory, the bitter feud between the
two commanders persisted.
Elsewhere on the field, a few ambitious regimental officers, spurred forward
by their successes on the first day, made poor decisions that cost many lives on
the second. The strong Confederate secondary fortifications on Peach Orchard
Hill mowed down the advancing blue lines, casting the attackers into confusion
and panic. Yet, in this carnage on the Union left flank, McDonough credits the
valor and sacrifice United States Colored Troops' valor here with finally
convincing many northerners that freedmen could fight, including the previously
doubting Thomas. This failed Union assault nevertheless forced Hood (perhaps
unnecessarily) to draw reinforcements from Shy's Hill on the Confederate left.
As the Federals retreated from Peach Orchard Hill, an onslaught of Union blue
descended upon the weakened Shy's Hill position. With their left crumbling,
many Confederates realized that their cause was lost, and entire units fled in
disorder or surrendered. The Army of Tennessee effectively evaporated. Hood's
gamble was lost, and along with it, went the hopes of the western Confederacy.
McDonough's Nashville succeeds in restoring the role of the oft-neglected
United States Colored Troops during the campaign and in revising portions of
the battle's chronology. Recently published primary sources form the book's
scholarly foundation, but McDonough has incorporated several new primary
sources. He provides a good summary of the historiographical debates
surrounding the campaign's more controversial aspects. McDonough's own
expert opinion and analysis are unfortunately sometimes lost in such discussions.
Furthermore, the personality and emotion that distinguish McDonough's earlier
style becomes less noticeable in the later chapters, settling down instead to a
more traditional fife and drum military history. A tendency to interject vignettes
describing the present-day condition of battlefields also frequently distracts the
narrative. These discussions would have been better left to a closing chapter on
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the continuing battles to preserve and remember the Civil War sites in Middle
Tennessee. The efforts to reconstruct Fort Negley (in progress at the time of the
book's publication and recently completed) or the failure to protect Franklin as a
national battlefield would have meshed well with the eloquent history of
Nashville's monument commemorating the battle that appears at the book's end.
Another exasperating feature is the lack of good battle maps. In particular, the
Battle of Nashville maps do little to improve comprehension of the battle's
progress. Many times the maps appear much later than they would have been
useful in the narrative. Inexplicably, two maps are duplicated in the text, one on
page 161 and 219, and another on 162 and 221.
Overall, Nashville is a solid and welcome addition to the McDonough series
dealing with the typically overshadowed western theater campaigns, and one that
the scholarly community and the general public can both enjoy.
Derek W. Frisby is an assistant professor at Middle Tennessee State
University and serves as editor of the West Tennessee Historical Society Papers.
He contributed the essay, Remember Fort Pillow!: Politics, Atrocity
Propaganda, and the Evolution of Hard War to Gregory J.W. Urwin's, ed.,
Black Flag Over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War (2003).
His dissertation, Homemade Yankees': West Tennessee Unionists during the
Civil War Era is currently being revised for publication.
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